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Recent  discussions  of  inflation  have  been  domi-  Thus:  for  example,  Professor  ~VilliamLLBQw.en-\nien-in--  -- 
nated  by  two  opposing  views.  On  the  one  side  are 
the  nwnetarists, who  argue  that  the  basic  cause  of 
inflation  is  excessive  monetary  growth,  i.e.,  a  rate  of 
increase  in  the  money  stock  substantially  in  excess  of 
the  rate  of  growth  of  real  output.  Competing  with 
the  monetarist  interpretation  is the  so-called  cost-p& 
view,  which  attributes  inflation  to  a  host  of  non- 
monetary  supply-oriented  influences  that  raise  costs 
and  hence  prices.  Although  modern  cost-push  theo- 
rists  do  recognize  the  importance  of  the  monetary 
factor,  they  generally  relegate  to  monetary  growth 
the  passive  or  accommodating  role  of  ratifying  cost 
increases  in  order  to  maintain  high  levels  of  produc- 
tion  and  employment.  In  the  1950’s and  1960’s cost- 
pushers  emphasized  union  wage  pressure  and  monop- 
oly  (administered)  pricing  policies-both  under- 
written  by  expansive  monetary  and  fiscal  policies- 
as  the  principal  causes  of  inflation.  Other  frequently 
mentioned  sources  of  cost  inflation  included  the  com- 
petitive  struggle  for  relative  income  shares,  labor  and 
capital  immobilities  (and  the  associated  wage/price 
rigidities),  job-information  deficiencies,  and  “ratchet 
effects”  stemming  from  the  downward  inflexibility 
of  specific  prices  to  shifts  in  the  composition  of 
demand.  Most  recently,  cost-pushers  have  blamed 
so-called  special  factors,  i.e.,  such  random  non- 
monetary  shocks  as  crop  failures,  commodity  short- 
ages,  and  the  OPEC-administered  increase  in  the 
price  of  oil,  for  causing  the  surge  of  inflation  to 
double-digit  levels  in  1973  and  1974. 
In  the  course  of  the  debate  over  inflation,  it  has 
his  well-known  essay  “Wage  Behavior  and  the  Cost- 
Inflation  Problem”  writes  that 
The  role  of  wage  behavior  in  the  inflationary 
process  has  been  one  of  the  most  hotly  debated 
issues  of  the  post-war  years  .  .  .  .  This  is  a  new 
develonment.  Prior  to  the  end  of  World  War  II 
most  discussions  of  inflation  paid  little,  if  any, 
attention  to  wage  determination.  Inflation  was 
analyzed  mainly-in  terms  of  changes  in  the  stock 
of  money  and  in  aggregate  spending  relative  to  the 
supply  of  goods  and  services  .  .  .  .  When  World 
War  II  ended  .  .  .  economists  in  many  Western 
Eurouean  countries  and  in  the  United  States  began 
to  speak  of  a  ‘new’  type  of  inflation,  comm&y 
referred  to  as  ‘cost  inflation.’  [Z;  pp.  B-91 
Similarly,  Professor  George  Leland  Bach,  in a recent 
book  entitled,  significantly  enough,  The  New  fnfla- 
t&z,  states  that 
become  commonplace  to  refer  to  cost-push  explana- 
tions  as  being  of  relatively  recent  origin.  piore  than 
one  analyst  has  stated  that  such  theories  estend  back 
no  further  than  the  end  of  JVorld  \Nar  II  and  that 
they  did  not  begin  to  ffourish  untii  the  mid-1950’s. 
*Reprinted  with  permission  from  Banca  Nazion&  de1  Lavmo 
Qua+terZ~ Review.  No.  116  (March  1976).  Slight  alterations  have 
been made  in  the  present  version. 
a  half  century  ago  .  .  . most  economists  saw  infia- 
tion  as  basically  the  result  of  excessive  spending 
*  .  .  generally  based  on  an  excessive  creation  of 
money  .  . .  .  More  recently  .  .  . these  beliefs  have 
been  challenged.  Certain  economists  see  a  new 
inflation-one  caused  by  big  unions  pushing  up 
costs  and  big  businesses  pushing  up  prices,  with  or 
without  an  excess  of  total  spending.  [ 1;  p.  71 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  show  that  the  fore- 
going  interpretations  are  wrong  ; that,  far  from  being 
new,  cost-push  theories  were  widespread  in  the 
1800’s  and  early  1900’s;  that  such  theories  were 
thoroughly  analyzed,  and  in  some  cases  sharply  criti- 
cized,  by  such  leading  neo-classical  monetary  the- 
orists  as  Knut  Wicksell,  Irving  Fisher.  J.  Laurence 
Laughlin,  and  John  N’aynard  Keynes  (of  the 
Treatise,  not  of  the  General  Theory)  ;  and,  finally, 
that  many  of  the  issues  in  current  and  recent  debates 
between  cost-pushers  and  monetarists  appeared  in 
the  earlier  literature  dealing  with  inflation. 
The  Role  of  Cost-Push  Theories  in  Classical 
Monetary  Debates  Although  the  main  focus  of 
this  article  is  on  the  neo-classical  analysis  of  cost- 
push  theories,  it  is  not  inappropriate  to  point  out 
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For  example,  long  before  Wicksell  and  Fisher  began 
to  write  on  monetary  questions  in  the  late  1800’s, 
cost-oriented  explanations  of  inflation  and  deflation 
had  already  played  prominent  roles  in  the  three 
leading  monetary  controversies  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  namely,  the  Bullionist,  Currency-Banking, 
and  Bimetallism  debates. 
The  first  of  these  controversies  concerned  the  rise 
in  the  price  of  gold  and  silver  bullion,  foreign  ex- 
change,  and  commodities  in Britain  following  the  sus- 
pension  of  the  gold  standard  during  the  period  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars.  Like  modern  monetarists  who 
locate  the  source  of  inflation  in  the  central  bank,  the 
-BMliunl^sts-blamed-the-price-increases--on  excessive 
monetary  expansion  by  the  Bank  of  England.  Their 
opponents,  the  Anti-Bullionists,  rejected  this  mone- 
tary  explanation,  attributing  the  price  and  exchange 
rate  movements  instead  to  non-monetary  causes, 
notably  domestic  crop  failures,  the  wartime  ‘dis- 
ruption  of  foreign  trade,  and  to  heavy  military  out- 
lays  abroad.  [4 ;  p.  281  The  Anti-Bullionists, 
moreover,  laid  particular  stress  on  influences  directly 
affecting  the  prices  of  individual  commodities  or 
groups  of  commodities,  especially  grains  and  other 
staple  foodstuffs.  Here  is  the  essence  of  the  cost- 
push  view  that  general  price  disturbances  stem  from 
non-monetary  influences  that  cause  a  series  of 
changes  in  the  individual  prices  of  key  commodities. 
Other  cost-push  propositions  that  surfaced  during 
the  Bullionist  debate  include  the  notions  of  passive 
money  and  reverse  causation.  The  former  states  that 
the  money  stock  is  an  endogenous  variable  that  re- 
sponds  passively  to  shifts  in  the  demand  for  it.  The 
latter  holds  that  the  channel  of  influence  or  direction 
of  causation  runs  from  the  level  of  economic  activity 
to  money  rather  than  vice  versa.  Both  ideas  ap- 
peared  in  the  Anti-Bullionists’  real-bills  doctrine  ac- 
cording  to  which  the  stock  of  money  would  never  be 
excessive  as  long  as  it  was  issued  only  against  bills 
of  exchange  arising  from  real  transactions  in  goods 
and  services.  Here  is  the  origin  of  the  view  that  the 
stock  of  money  is  demand  determined  and  therefore 
exerts  no  independent  influence  on  prices  and, 
moreover,  that  monetary  growth  is  the  result-not 
the  caus&f  increases  in  spending  and  economic 
activity. 
The  second  debate  in  which  cost-push  theories 
played  a leading  role  was  the  Currency-Banking  con- 
troversy  over  the  principles  of  regulating  the  bank- 
note  issue  as  embodied  in  the  celebrated  Bank 
Charter  Act  of  1844.  In  opposition  to  the  quantity 
theory  reasoning  of  the  Currency  School,  leader:s  of 
the  Banking  School,  particularly  Thomas  Tooke, 
developed  non-monetary  theories  of price  movements. 
Sir  T.  E.  Gregory,  in  his  Introduction  to Tooke  and 
Newmarch’s  A  HISTORY  OF  PRICES  (1924), 
writes  that  Tooke  had  an  intense  “preoccupation  with 
the  special  factors  influencing  particular  prices”  which 
enabled  him  “to  take  full  account  of particular  [price] 
variations”  while  simultaneously  rejecting  “the  rigid 
connection  between  the  quantity  of  money  and  the 
state  of  the  price  level  postulated  by  the  Currency 
School  .  .  .”  [9;  p.  211  This  preoccupation  with 
special  factors  influencing  particular  prices  continues 
to  be  typical  of  current  cost-pushers,  who  attribute 
the  rampant  inflation  of  1973  and  1974  to  such  ran- 
dom  shocks  as  crop  failures,  the  disappearance  of 
anchovies  off  the  coast  of  Peru,  and  the  OPEC- 
imposed  quadruphng  of  the  price  of  oil. 
Tooke,  in  his  own  version  of  the  cost-push  theory, 
stated  that  general  prices  were  determined  by  factor 
incomes  (wages,  rents,  profits,  etc.)  and  not  by  the 
quantity  of  money.  He  did  not  explain  how  th.ese 
price-determining  factor  incomes  themselves  were 
determined  but  left  the  question  of  their  origin  open 
to  a  variety  of  possibIe  interpretations.  His  theory 
of  price  inflation  is  therefore  suggestive  of  recent 
wage-cost-push  and  structural  theories  that  (1)  link 
inflation  to  some  arbitrary  non-monetary  element  in 
the  institutional  environment,  e.g.,  autonomous  in- 
creases  in wage  incomes,  production  bottlenecks,  par- 
ticular  supply  inelasticities,  institutional  price  rigidi- 
ties,  et&,  and  (2)  stress  the  inflationary  role  of  the 
competitive  struggle  for  relative  shares  in the  national 
income.  In  any  event,  since  factor  incomes  are  simply 
the  sum  of  factor  service  prices,  it  is  obvious  that 
Tooke  came  periIously  close  to  explaining  prices  in 
terms  of  prices. 
Other  cost-push  doctrines  enunciated  by  the  Bank- 
ing  School  include  the  notions  of ‘a passive  demand- 
determined  money  supply  and  the  existence  of  re- 
verse  causation  running  from  income  to  money  rather 
than  vice  versa.  These  notions  were  embodied  in 
the  real-bills  doctrine  to  which  the  Banking  School, 
like  its  Anti-Buhionist  predecessors,  adhered. 
Cost  theories  competed  again  with  the  quantity 
theory  during  the  Bimetallism  controversy  over  the 
proposed  monetization  of  silver  in  the  latter  decades 
of the  nineteenth  century.  Using  the  quantity  theory, 
Bimetallists  explained  the  secular  price  deflation  of 
1873-1896  as  the  failure  of  the  money  stock  to  grow 
as  fast  as  real  output.  Supporters  of  the  gold  staa- 
dard,  however,  adhered  to  cost  theories  of  deflation. 
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flze  A’inefeenth  Cenfzrry  ( 194s))  has  summarized 
these  cost-push  views.  Gold  monometallists,  he 
writes, 
.  .  . mustered  enormous  evidence  attesting  to  new 
methods  and  machines,  cheapened  transport  costs, 
new  raw  material  sources,  and  increased  competi- 
tion.  They  tended  to  deprecate  the  alleged  mone- 
tary  forces.  They  insisted,  in  short,  that  individ- 
ual  cost  curves  had  fallen  far  and  shifted  to  the 
right:  that  the  average  cost  of  producing  a  given 
output  had  decreased,  and  that  diminishing  returns 
-rising  marginal  costs-set  in  at  a  further  point, 
requiring  a  higher  level  of  demand  to  yield  rising 
prices.  They  found  in  the  case  of  each  market  no 
residual  movement  to  be  explained  after  its  unique 
conditions  were  examined.  No  monetary  factor  was 
required.  Their  motto  might  have  been  .  .  .  ‘Gold 
has  behaved  very  well.’  [15;  p.  601 
This  completes  the  review  of  the  role  of  cost-push 
theories  of  price  movements  in  nineteenth  century 
classical  policy  debates.  The  following  paragraphs 
consider  what  such  leading  neo-classical  monetary 
theorists  as  Wicksell,  Laughlin,  Fisher,  and  Keynes 
-all  writing  between  1896  and  1930-had  to  say 
about  cost-push  analysis. 
Neo-Classical  Views  of  Cost  Inflation:  Knut 
Wicksell  Even  a  cursory  examination  of  Wick- 
seh’s  work  shows  how  erroneous  is  the  view  that 
cost  theories  of  inflation  and  defiation  are  of  recent 
vintage.  Thus,  in  Chapter  3  of  his  l&crest  and 
Prl:ces  (189s)  he  refers  to  such  theories  as  already 
being  “so  widespread”  that  merely  to  question  them 
%ould  seem  almost  paradoxical.”  He  proceeds  to 
describe  bow  these  theories  have  been  used  to  ex- 
plain  “the  falI  of  commodity  prices  during  recent 
decades.” 
The  decrease  in the  cost  of  production  of  commodi- 
ties,  the  improvements  in  transport,  etc.,  are  often 
put  forward  without  further  explanation  as  inde- 
pendent  causes  of  the  fall  in  commodity  prices  . . . . 
It  is  as  though  this  kind  of  explanation  replaces 
every  other  theory  of  the  value  of  money.  The 
reasoning  is  somewhat  as  follows:  Technical  prog- 
ress  results  in  a  fall  in  the  cost  of  production,.  and 
so  in  the  price,  first  of  one  group  of  commodities, 
then  of  another.  The  extension  of  this  fall  in 
price  to  all,  or  to  most,  groups  of  commodities 
means  a  fall  in  the  general  level  of  prices  .  .  .  . 
[17;  p.  251 
Conversely,  when  inflation  is  the  problem, 
an  explanation  is  looked  for  (as  in  the  case  of 
Thomas  Tooke  and  his  followers)  in  bad  harvests, 
in  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  particular  com- 
modities  of  which  the  supply  remains  unaltered,  and 
in  the  effect  of  tariffs  and  indirect  taxes  in  raising 
the  prices  of  such  commodities.  [17;  pp.  25-61 
Elsewhere  he  cites  additional  “alleged  causes  of  a 
rise  in  prices”  in  which  cost-pushers  “take  refuge.” 
These  include  ‘Me  supposed  screwing  up  of  prices 
by  cartels  and  trusts,  the  greed  of  middlemen,  trade 
union  claims  for  higher  wages,  etc.”  [ 18 ; p.  1541 
Wicksell  commented  extensively  on  the  monetary 
assumptions  underlying  cost-push  theories.  He 
stated  that  cosr-push  models  are  incapable  of  gener- 
ating  sustained  inflation  without  an  accommodating 
expansion  in  the  money  stock.  In  his  words,  infla- 
tion  “can  never  be  governed  by  the  conditions  of  the 
commodity  market  itself  {or  of  the  production  of 
goods)  .”  Rather,  it  is  “in  the  relations  of  this 
market  to  the  lrtoney  market”  that  one  finds  the 
causes  of  infiation.  [ 17;  p.  241  1n  short,  cost- 
pushers  must  implicitly  assume  that  cost  increases 
will  be  automatically  validated  by  permissive  expan- 
sions  of  the  money  stock.  As  Wicksell  put  it,  cost- 
push  theories  qpicalfy  regard  money  “as  a  kind  of 
amorphous,  infinitely  elastic,  or  plastic  mass  which 
adapts  itself  without  any  pressure  to  any  price  level 
and  is  therefore  entirely  passive  in  relation  to  the 
pricing  mechanism,  whilst  the  latter  is regulated  only 
by  circumstances  concerning  the  commodities  them- 
selves.”  [ 18;  p.  1541  Cost-pushers,  he  claims,  have 
become  so  accustomed  “to  seeing  in  the  modern 
credit  and  banking  system  a  means  of  satisfying  any 
demand  whatever  on  the  part  of society  for  a medium 
of  exchange  that  they  cannot  conceive  of  money 
influencing  prices  in  one  direction  or  the  other.” 
[IS;  p.  1541 
Another  feature  of  cost  theories,  noted  by  Wick- 
sell,  is  their  tendency  to  attribute  macroeconomic 
phenomena  to  microeconomic  causes.  As  Wicksell 
put  it,  “The  same  causes  .  .  . cited  to  account  for  a 
rise  or  fall  in  the  price  of  any  single  com+zodity  are 
put  forward  .  .  .  as  the  source  of  changes  in  the 
general  level  of  prices.”  f 17 ; p.  261 
Wicksell’s  criticisms  of  cost-push  theories  sound 
remarkably  like  those  of  modern  monetarists.  Cost- 
push  reasoning,  he  says,  “contains  an  inadmissible 
generalization;  for  arguments  which  are  valid  only 
when  it  is a  matter  of  relative  prices  are  applied  to  a 
field  in  which  they  no  longer  possess  any  meaning, 
i.e.,  to  the  absolute  prices  of  commodities,  expressed 
in  money.”  [ 18;  p.  1.541  Moreover,  cost-pushers 
tend  to  ignore  the  possibility  that,  with  the  money 
stock  and  total  spending  both  constant,  cost-induced 
rises  in  the  prices  of  specific  commodities  may  be 
offset  by  compensating  reductions  in  the  prices  of 
other  items.  For  example,  such  cost-raising  influ- 
ences  as 
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edly  lead  to  higher  prices  of  the  commodities  so 
taxed,  but  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  other 
goods  will  remain  unchanged  in  price  and  that  _  _ 
therefore  the  general  price  level  will  rise.  In  any 
case,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  nossibility  of  a 
simultaneous  pressure  on  and  fall  in  the  prices  of 
other  goods-as  the  Quantity  Theory  would  lead 
us  to  suppose-so  that  the  average  price  level 
would  remain  unchanged  unless  there  existed  some 
monetary  cause  for  the  change.  [18;  p.  lSS] 
These  same  allegations-the  confusion  between 
relative  vs.  absolute  prices,  the  failure  to  distinguish 
between  specific  prices  and  the  average  level  of prices 
-continue  to  survive  and  flourish  in  modern  mone- 
tarist  criticism  of  cost-push  reasoning.  Thus  Milton 
Friedman,  commenting  on  the  alleged  source  of  the 
double-digit  inflation  of  1973-74,  writes 
What  of  [the  rise  in  the  prices  of]  oil  and  food 
. . .  ?  Are  they  not  the  obvious,immediate  cause  of 
the  price  explosion?  Not  at  all.  It  is  essential  to 
distinguish  changes  in  relative  prices  from  changes 
in  absolute  prices.  The  special  conditions  that 
drove  up  the  prices  of  oil  and  food  required  pur- 
chasers  to  spend  more  on  them,  leaving  less  to 
spend  on  other  items.  Did  that  not  force  other- 
prices  to  go  down  or  to  rise  less  rapidly  than 
otherwise?  Why  should  the  average  level  of  all 
prices  be  affected  significantly  by  changes  in  the 
prices  of  some  things  relative  to  others?  Thanks 
to  delays  in  adjustment,  the  rapid  rises  in  oil  and 
food  prices  may  have  temporarily  raised  the  rate 
of  inflation  somewhat.  In  the  main,  however,  they 
have  been  convenient  excuses  for  besieged  govern- 
ment  officials  and  harried  iournalists  rather  than 
reasons  for  the  price  explosion.  [S;  p.  733 
The  basic  source  of  inflation,  Friedman  contends,  “is 
the  faster  growth  in  the  quantity  of  money  than  in 
output.”  [8;  p.  731  Neither  Wicksell  nor  Friedman 
mentions  a point  emphasized  by  modern  cost-pushers, 
namely,  that  with  zero  monetary  growth  and  sticky 
(i.e.,  downwardly  inflexible)  prices,  particular  price 
increases  will  tend  to  generate  compensating  reduc- 
tions  not  in  other  prices  but  rather  in  output  and 
employment.  Given  the  government’s  high-employ- 
ment  objectives,  however,  such  outcomes,  cost- 
pushers  argue,  will  not  be  permitted  to  occur.  In- 
stead,  specific  price  increases  must  necessarily  be 
accommodated  by  whatever  monetary  expansion  is 
required  to  maintain  output  and  employment  at  high 
levels.  Thus,  the  political  constraints  imposed  by  the 
commitment  to  full  employment  enter  directly  into 
the  process  by  which  individual  price  increases  are 
translated  into  general  inflationary  pressures. 
J.  Laurence  Laughlin  If  Wicksell  was  one  of 
the  harsher  critics  of the  cost-push  theory,  then  surely 
one  of  its  strongest  proponents  was  J.  Laurence 
Laughlin,  the  first  chairman  of  the  Department  of 
Economics  of  the  University  of  Chicago.  Today 
Chicago  is  identified  with  the  quantity  theory.  At 
the  turn  of  the  century,  however,  it  was  a  citadel  of 
anti-quantity  theory  doctrine  with  Laughlin  as  clhief 
expositor  of  that  doctrine. 
Laughlin  stated  his  views  on  inflation  first  in  an 
article  in  the  1909  Journal of Political Economy  and 
again  at  the  1910  meetings  of  the  American  Eco- 
nomic  Association  in a session  dealing  with  the  causes 
of  rising  prices  between  1896  and  1909.  He  starts 
out  by  rejecting  the  monetarist  explanation  of 
inflation. 
The  old  [quantity]  theory  of  Ricardo  and  Hume 
no  longer  holds  undisputed  sway  .  .  .  .  There  can 
be  no  question  that  the  causes  for  the  remarkable 
rise  in  prices  .  .  .  cannot  be  looked  for  in  those 
influences  directly  affecting  gold  [i.e.,  money]. 
111;  pp.  257,  2633 
Instead,  the  causes  of  inflation  “must  be  sought  in 
the  [real]  forces  settling  particular  prices.”  [12; 
p.  1781  These  forces  include  “progress  of  invention 
and  increased  skill  of  management,  .  .  .  increased 
wages,  higher  cost  of  materials,  higher  customs- 
duties,  and  monopolies,  or  combinations.”  [ 11;  pp. 
265-61 
Laughlin  described  several  distinct  types  of  cost- 
push  mechanisms,  namely,  (1)  wage-push,  (2)  ad- 
ministered  pricing,  and  (3)  commodity  shortages. 
His  description  of  wage-push,  quoted  below,  high- 
lights  the  role  of  ratchet  effects  and  unilateral  wage- 
setting  by  trade  unions.  Both  phenomena  imply  the 
existence  of  a  substantial  degree  of  monopoly  power 
in  the  labor  market.  Curiously  enough,  however, 
unionized  workers  constituted  only  about  6  perce:nt 
of the  labor  force  when  Laughlin  wrote  the  following  : 
.  .  .  there  has  been  a  marked  advance  in  wages. 
[Thus]  one  of  the  main  elements  entering  into  the 
expenses  of  production  of  all  kinds  of  goods  has 
risen  in  cost,  and  had  its  effect  in  raising  prices 
Once  that  a  high  rate  of  wages  has  been 
granted,  it  is  not  easy  for  employers  to  force  a 
reduction  .  .  .  .  The  question  is  .  .  .  whether  the 
rise  of  wages  is  one  of  the  causes  of  the  rise  of 
prices  or  whether  the  rise  of  prices  has  made 
possible  the  rise  of  wages  . . .s  .  There  seems  to  be 
an  influence  independent  of  prices  which  has  acted 
to  raise  the  rate  of  wages.  And  this  influence  un- 
doubtedly  is  due  . . . to  the  pressure  of  labor-unions, 
which  have  been  very  active  in  recent  years.  111; 
pp.  268-91 
Laughlin  did  not  stop  at  wage-push.  Describisg 
the  types  of  inflation  stemming  from  monopoly  ad- 
ministering  pricing,  Laughlin  said  that  “the  forma- 
tion  of  combinations  is  unquestionably  the  strongest 
force  in  this  period  working  for  higher  prices.”  [ 11; 
p.  2701  “The  whole  r&on  d’etre  of  monopolistic 
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competition.  As  every  economist  knows,  in  the  con- 
ditions  under  which  many  industries  are  today  orga- 
nized,  expenses  of production  have  no  direct  relation 
to  prices.”  [ 12;  p.  1851 
A  third  type  of  cost  inflation  cited  by  Laughlin  is 
that  due  to raw material  shortages  and  crop  failures. 
Commodity  shortages  affect  the  rate  of  inflation  di- 
rectly  and  also  indirectly  through  their  feedback  into 
wage  demands.  With  reference  to  the  latter,  Laugh- 
lin remarked  that  the  increased  price  of food  resulting 
from  crop  shortages  “wipes  out  all the  gains  of  previ- 
ous  increases  of  wages,  and  drives  laborers  to  repeat 
their  demands  for  higher  pay,  thus  working  again 
to  increase  expenses  of  production.”  [12 ;  p.  1841 
Irving  Fisher  The  most  influential  American 
critic  of  cost-push  doctrines  in  the  pre-war  period 
was  Irving  Fisher,  America’s  leading  quantity  the- 
orist.  Fisher’s  comments  on  cost-push  theory  are 
contained  in  many  of  his  monetary  works  including 
his  classic  The Purchasing  Power  of  Money  ( 1911), 
his  remarks  at  the  1910  AEA  session  on  the  causes 
of  inflation,  and  his  Stab&zing  the Do&z?- (1920). 
Fisher  criticized  cost-push  theories  on  at  least  four 
grounds.  First,  he  argued  that  such  theories  often 
fail  to  distinguish  between  changes  in  relative  prices 
and  changes  in  absolute  prices.  The  result  is  con- 
fusion,  with  cost-pushers  erroneously  ascribing  real 
or  microeconomic  causes  to  what  is  essentially  a 
monetary  or  macroeconomic  phenomenon.  In  Fisher’s 
own  words,  cost-pushers  “have  seriously  sought  the 
explanation  of  a general  change  in  price  levels  in  the 
individual  price  changes  of  various  commodities  con- 
sidered  separately.  Much  of  their  reasoning  goes  no 
farther  than  to  explain  one  price  in  terms  of  other 
prices.”  [5 ;  p.  1761  Elsewhere  he  listed  41  fre- 
quently  cited  non-monetary  causes  oi  inflation  and 
noted  that  “while  some  of  them  are  important  factors 
in  raising  particular  prices,  none  of  them  .  .  .  has 
been  important  in  raising  the  general  scale  of 
prices.”  16;  p.  111  Fisher  pointed  out  that  “no, 
explanation  of  a  general  rise  in  prices  is  sufficient 
which  merely  explains  one  price  in  terms  of  another 
price.”  [6;  p.  141 
Second,  Fisher  argued  that  anything  that  affects 
the  price  level  must  do  so  through  changes  in  the 
stock  of  money,  its  velocity,  or  the  volume  of  trans- 
actions:  if  these  magnitudes  remain  constant,  the 
price  level  cannot  change.  There  is  no  reason  to 
believe  that  changes  in the  specific  prices  of  unionized 
labor  or  monopoly  products  will  affect  these’macro- 
economic  variables.  Therefore,  if “trade  unions  seek 
to  raise  prices  of  labor  while  trusts  raise  prices  of 
commodities.”  the  general  price  level  “cannot 
change.”  [5 ; pp.  179-801  The  individual  prices  of 
union  Iabor  and  monopofy  products  might  rise,  to  be 
sure,  but  these  changes  in  particular  “parts  of  the 
price  level  may  occur  only  at  the  expense  of opposite 
changes  in  other  parts.”  [ 5 ; p.  1803 
Fisher’s  third  criticism  referred  to  the  tendency  of 
cost-pushers  to  resort  to  ad  hoc  explanations  stress- 
ing  temporary  disturbances,  random  events,  and 
other  special  factors.  He  termed  this  practice  “the 
error  of  selecting  special  cases,”  and  he  argued  that 
because  such  alleged  causes  of  inflation  occur  only 
sporadically,  are  short-lived,  and  affect  only  a limited 
range  of  commodities  they  could  not  explain  a  sus- 
tained  rise  in  the  level  of  all  prices.  As  he  expressed 
it,  “special  causes  working  on  selected  commodities” 
would  not  “be  general  enough  to  explain  the  con- 
certed  behavior  of  .  .  . changes  in  the  general  scale 
or  level  of prices.”  16; p.  161  Only  excessive  mone- 
tary  growth  could  account  for  sustained  inflation,  or 
as he  put  it,  “in  almost  all  great  and  prolonged  price 
movements  the  chief  factor  is the  quantity  of money.” 
E6;  p.  54 
The  fourth  reason  for  Fisher’s  opposition  to  cost- 
push  theories  was  his  belief  that  they  would  lead  to 
inappropriate  policies,  including  price  controls  and 
incomes  policies.  Such  “vicious  remedies,”  he  ar- 
gued,  “are  often  not  only  futile,  but  harmful.”  [6; 
pp.  75, 601  He  further  stated  that  although  incomes 
policies  focus  directly  on  “the  problem  of  the  size  of 
our  incomes,”  they  are  also  “expected  to  solve  the 
second  problem  too,”  i.e.,  the  problem  of  inflation. 
Unfortunately,  however,  incomes  policies  cannot  re- 
duce  inflation,  and  the  inevitable  result  is  that  “dis- 
appointment  iollows  their  application.”  In  short, 
“unless  a  genuine  solution”  to  inflation  is  found,  “a 
bewildered  and  infuriated  public  is  apt  to  keep  on 
trying  every  sort  of  alleged  remedy,  good,  bad,  or 
indifferent,  often  with  disastrous  results.”  [6;  p.  811 
Finally,  mention  should  be  made  of  Fisher’s  1926 
contribtltion-only  recently  rediscovered  [3]-to  a 
topic  that  is central  to current  debates  between  mone- 
tarists  and  cost-pushers.  The  subject,  of  course,  is 
what  is  now  known  as  the  Phillips  curve  trade-off 
between  inflation  and  unemployment.  Using  ana- 
lytical  techniques  that,  in  econometric  sophistication, 
rival  all but  the  very  latest  work  in the  Phillips  curve, 
Fisher  discovered  a  strong  inverse  relation  between 
the  inflation  rate  and  the  level  of unemployment.  [7] 
He  attributed  this  relation  to  the  tendency  for  busi- 
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ginning  of  an  unanticipated  inflation.  He  suggested, 
however,  that  the  trade-off  was  temporary  and  would 
vanish  in  the  long  run.  Fisher  thus  became  the  first 
economist  to  distinguish  between  the  short-run  down- 
ward-sloping  Phillips  curve  and  the  long-run  vertical 
curve. 
J.  M.  Keynes  Cost-push  theorizing  was  not 
limited  solely  to  Swedish  and  American  economists 
during  the  pre-war  era.  In  Britain,  John  Maynard 
Keynes  formulated  a cost-push  theory in  his  Treatise 
on  Money  (1930).  At  that  time,  of  course,  he  still 
considered  himself  a  neo-classical  economist  and  a 
member  of  the  Cambridge  school  with  a  tradition 
extending  back  at  least  to  Alfred  Marshall. 
In  the  Treatise  Keynes  distinguished  between  two 
types  of  inflation  :  ( 1)  profit  inflation  and  (2)  in- 
come  inflation.  The  first  refers  to  what  today  is 
popularly  termed  demand-pull  inflation,  i.e.,  a  rising 
price  level  propelled  by  an  excess  monetary  demand 
for  the  economy’s  available  output.  The  second, 
however,  refers  to  pure  cost-push  inflation  char- 
acterized  by  autonomous  (or  in  Keynes’s  words, 
“spontaneous”)  increases  in  wages  and  prices  owing 
chiefly  to  “the  powers  and  activities  of  Trade 
Unions.”  [lo;  pp.  167-81 
Keynes’s  analysis  contained  at  least  two  contribu- 
tions  that  presaged  several  post-war  developments  in 
the  theory  of  inflation.  First,  he  discussed  the  rela- 
tionships  among  wages,  prices,  and  productivity 
within  a  framework  very  similar  to  the  so-called 
price  equation,  p  =  w  -  q,  employed  in  modern 
cost-push  models,  where  p,  w,  and  q  represent  the 
percentage  rates  of  change  of  prices,  wages,  and 
productivity,  respectively.  Second,  he  discussed  the 
problem  of  combatting  cost-  or  supply-induced  in- 
flation  with  demand-management  weapons,  i.e., 
monetary  policy.  Included  in  this  latter  discussion, 
incidentally,  is  a  rudimentary  treatment  of  the  tar- 
gets-instruments  problem,  in  which  Keynes  pointed 
out  that  the  simultaneous  stabilization  of  prices, 
wages,  and  the  foreign  exchange  rate  is  contingent 
upon  the  authorities’  having  possession  of  the  requi- 
site  instruments  of  control. 
Concluding  Comments  This  article  has  concen- 
trated  on  the  cost-inflation  analyses  of  four  leading 
neo-classical  monetary  theorists  whose  work  is repre- 
sentative  of much  of the  monetary  research  conducted 
in  the  pre-war  period.  In  doing  so,  the  article  has 
no  doubt  neglected  numerous  other  economists  who 
also  discussed  cost-push  inflation  in  the  pre-war  era. 
For  example,  nothing  was  said  about  Gardiner 
Means’s  work  in  the  1930’s  on  administered  pricing 
[ 131, nor  of  F.  C. Mills’s  analysis  of  rigidities  in  the 
structure  of  individual  prices.  [ 14;  pp.  31-Z]  Both 
of  these  studies,  of  course,  had  important  implim- 
tions  regarding  the  impact  of  autonomous  increases 
in costs  on  price  level  movements.  Nor  was  me&on 
made  of  the  statistical  studies  of  Carl  Snyder,  stud.ies 
that  purported  to  show  that  over  long  periods  of time 
all  prices  undergo  roughly  equiproportional  changes, 
thus  preserving  the  secular  stability  of  price  relation- 
ships.  Snyder  concluded  from  his  findings  that 
movements  in  the  entire  set  of  commodity  prices 
could  not  be explained  by real  disturbances  that  cause 
random  changes  in relative  prices,  but  that  such  price 
movements  must  be  attributed  to  changes  in  the 
money  suppIy,  which  affected  prices  as a whole.  [ 161 
Nevertheless,  the  evidence  presented  is  sufficient 
to  provide  strong  support  for  the  main  contention  of 
the  article,  namely,  that  cost-push  theories,  far  from 
being  of  recent  origin,  were  thoroughly  and  rep&- 
edly  discussed  in  the  pre-war  monetary  literature. 
This  is not  to  say,  however,  that  the  older  and  mod- 
ern  theories  are  identical.  On  the  contrary,  modern 
cost-push  doctrine  contains  a crucial  element  missing 
from  the  older  version,  namely,  the  concept  of  vali- 
dation.  The  term  validation  refers  to  the  policy  re- 
actions  of  authorities  committed  to  the  goal  of  high 
employment.  According  to  the  validation  doctrine, 
widespread  price  inflexibility  and  the  growing  public 
concern  over  unemployment  exert  pressure  on  the 
policy  authorities  to  validate  cost  increases  with  e.x- 
pansive  monetary-fiscal  policies,  thereby  transform- 
ing  specific  price  increases  into  generalized  inflation. 
Still,  many  other  contemporary  cost-push  proposi- 
tions  and  criticisms-e.g.,  the  inflationary  impact  of 
unions,  monopolies,  and  commodity  shortages  ;  the 
emphasis  on  price  rigidities  and  noncompetitive 
market  behavior;  the  appeal  to  exogenous  shocks  or 
special  factors;  the  role  of  passive  monetary  growth 
in  accommodating  cost  increases  ;  the  alleged  t&e- 
off  between  inflation  and  unemployment;  the  prob- 
lem  of  fighting  supply-oriented  inflation  with  de- 
mand-management  policies  ;  and,  finally,  the  wage- 
productivity-price  nexus-all  were  inherited  without 
serious  modification  from  neo-classical  analysts.  lt 
follows,  therefore,  that  the  analysis  of  cost-pus#h 
inflation  should  be  regarded  not  as  a  new  develop- 
ment  but  rather  as  the  revival  and  restatement  of 
long-established  ideas  thoroughly  familiar  to  earlier 
economists. 
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